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This Article examines the Federal Communications 
Commission’s (“FCC”) regulation of profane language since 
2004. That year is when the FCC, facing a moral panic, radically 
altered its profanity tack. Unlike obscenity and indecency, 
profanity—a third content category over which the Commission 
holds statutory authority—is seldom analyzed.  
 
This Article argues that the FCC’s current definition of profane 
language not only strips its meaning from its religious roots, but 
also: (1) is both unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; and (2) 
violates core First Amendment principles against censoring 
speech that merely offends. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
reinvigorated emphasis on safeguarding offensive expression in 
cases such as Matal v. Tam and Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission further portends the 
unconstitutionality of the FCC’s profanity classification.  
 
In brief, when the Commission abruptly gutted its old definition 
of profane language fifteen years ago, that term became an empty 
vessel. The FCC then poured into it an unconstitutionally 
nebulous effort to censor sexual speech that is neither obscene 
nor indecent. This Article concludes that Congress should 
jettison the FCC’s statutory power over profane language if the 
Commission fails to readily articulate a new definition that is 
narrow and clear. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Shortly after Ajit Pai became chairman of the Federal 
Communications Commission 1 (“FCC” or “Commission”) in 
January 2017,2 he observed that “the law that is on the books 
today requires that broadcasters keep it clean so to speak.”3 The 
FCC’s Enforcement Bureau now can put that law to the test. 
That is because the Parents Television Council4 (“PTC”), which 
boasts a long history of “[h]olding the FCC’s metaphorical feet 
to the fire to enforce the law,” 5  filed a complaint against a 
Washington, D.C.-area television station over a May 2018 
episode of ABC’s Good Morning America that featured the word 
“fuck.”6  
As Melissa Henson, the PTC’s program director, 
described it in a letter to Rosemary Harold, chief of the FCC’s 
Enforcement Bureau, 7  Good Morning America broadcast “a 
prerecorded piece about disgraced movie mogul Harvey 
Weinstein.” 8  The segment incorporated an audio clip of 
SiriusXM satellite radio host Howard Stern interviewing actress 
Gwyneth Paltrow about an encounter she had with Weinstein.9 
In that clip, Stern—referencing Paltrow’s then-boyfriend, actor 
Brad Pitt—exclaims “[w]hen you tell Brad, Brad says, ‘Fuck this 
                                                 
1 The FCC “regulates interstate and international communications by radio, 
television, wire, satellite and cable in all 50 states, the District of Columbia and U.S. 
territories. An independent U.S. government agency overseen by Congress, the 
[C]ommission is the United States’ primary authority for communications law, 
regulation and technological innovation.” About the FCC: What We Do, FED. COMM. 
COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/about-fcc/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 1, 
2018). The FCC was created in 1934. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (providing an 
overview of the FCC’s authority and mission). 
2 See About the FCC: Leadership, Ajit Pai, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/about/leadership/ajit-pai (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting 
that Pai “was designated Chairman by President Donald J. Trump in January 
2017”). 
3 John Eggerton, FCC’s Pai on Broadcast TV: ‘Keep It Clean’, BROAD. & CABLE (Feb. 
16, 2017), https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/fccs-pai-broadcast-tv-keep-it-
clean-163412. 
4 The Parents Television Commission describes its mission as protecting “children 
and families from graphic sex, violence and profanity in the media, because of their 
proven long-term harmful effects.” The PTC Mission, PARENTS TELEVISION COUNCIL, 
http://w2.parentstv.org/main/About/mission.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2018). 
5 Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, The Parents Television Council Uncensored: An 
Inside Look at the Watchdog of the Public Airwaves and the War on Indecency with Its 
President, Tim Winter, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 293, 295 (2011). 
6 John Eggerton, PTC Files Indecency Complaint Against Sinclair’s WJLA Over ‘GMA’ F-
Bomb, BROAD. & CABLE (June 11, 2018), 
https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/ptc-files-indecency-complaint-against-
sinclairs-wjla-over-gma-f-bomb.  
7 Letter from Melissa Henson, Program Director of the Parents Television Council, 
to Rosemary Harold, Chief of the Enforcement Bureau of the Federal 
Communications Commissions (May 30, 2018) (on file with author). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
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guy I’m going to go over and confront him.’” 10  Henson’s 
missive, copied to all five FCC commissioners, pointed out that 
Stern’s utterance of fuck “occurred during a taped and edited 
package segment. The network had every opportunity to edit the 
word out before it went to air.”11  
What can the FCC do about such language? It lacks the 
power to forbid or censor speech on the broadcast airwaves in 
advance of publication. 12  That rule squares with the time-
honored First Amendment 13  doctrine that prior restraints on 
expression are presumptively unconstitutional. 14  Yet when it 
comes to subsequent punishments 15 —sanctions imposed on 
over-the-air broadcast stations for sexually explicit expression 
they have already carried16—the FCC wields a regulatory trident. 
Specifically, Congress vests the Commission with 
statutory authority under 18 U.S.C. § 1464 to punish 
broadcasters via license revocation,17 monetary forfeitures18 and 
cease-and-desist orders 19  for carrying three types of content: 
obscenity, indecency and profanity. 20  Although, the FCC 
                                                 
10 Id.  
11 Id.  
12 The Communications Act of 1934 provides that: 
Nothing in this Chapter shall be understood or 
construed to give the Commission the power of 
censorship over the radio communications or 
signals transmitted by any radio station, and 
no regulation or condition shall be 
promulgated or fixed by the Commission 
which shall interfere with the right of free 
speech by means of radio communication. 
47 U.S.C. § 326 (2012). 
13 The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that 
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.” 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses were incorporated 
more than ninety years ago through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause 
as fundamental liberties to apply to state and local government entities and officials. 
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
14 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971). See Neb. Press Ass’n v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the 
most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”).  
15 See generally Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (noting “the 
distinction, solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent 
punishments”); WXIA-TV v. Georgia, 811 S.E.2d 378, 386 (2018) (“In the context 
of the First Amendment, the courts traditionally have distinguished between prior 
restraints and subsequent punishments, and they usually have subjected prior 
restraints to more exacting scrutiny.”). 
16 See generally Barrett v. Walker City Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(noting that subsequent punishments “regulate a given type of speech by penalizing 
the speech only after it occurs”) (emphasis in original). 
17 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(6) (2012). 
18 47 U.S.C. § 503(b) (2012). 
19 47 U.S.C. § 312(b) (2012). 
20 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). 
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punishes stations for airing obscenity at all times of the day,21 it 
penalizes them for indecency and profanity only during a 
sixteen-hour period stretching from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m.22 Of these 
three categories, profanity—in the parlance of our times23—is the 
ugly (and ignored) stepchild. It also is this Article’s focus. 
While the United States Supreme Court has addressed 
both obscenity24 and indecency,25 it has not directly analyzed the 
                                                 
21 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(a) (2018) (“No licensee of a radio or television broadcast 
station shall broadcast any material which is obscene.”). 
22 See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999(b) (2018) (“No licensee of a radio or television broadcast 
station shall broadcast on any day between 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. any material which is 
indecent.”); Obscenity, Indecency & Profanity—FAQ, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170204143249/https://www.fcc.gov/reports-
research/guides/obscenity-indecency-profanity-faq (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (“FCC 
decisions also prohibit the broadcast of profane material between 6 a.m. and 10 
p.m.”). 
23 The ugly stepchild, although perhaps politically incorrect, is a common phrase in 
the news media. See, e.g., Rachel Abrams, Can Taco Bell Architect Duplicate Success at 
Chipotle?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2018, at B3 (“Instead of being the ugly 
stepchild, Taco Bell became frequently cited as one of the top chains in the Yum 
Brands empire, which also includes Pizza Hut and KFC.”); Gary Stoller, Hotel 
Schools Are in With Inn Crowd, USA TODAY, Jan. 8, 2008, at 1B (“Hospitality schools 
have long been regarded as the ugly stepchild on many campuses where teaching 
students how to serve hotel and restaurant customers has been perceived as inferior 
to other academic fields.”); Michael Upchurch, Real-Life Drama of Homicide Detectives, 
WASH. POST, June 12, 2016, at B8 (quoting journalist Del Quentin Wilber for the 
proposition that “[h]igh crime rates and underperforming schools have cast Prince 
George’s County as the ugly stepchild of the Washington region”). 
24 The U.S. Supreme Court held more than sixty years ago that obscenity is not 
protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech. See Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that “obscenity is not within the area of 
constitutionally protected speech or press”). The current three-part test for obscenity, 
which was fashioned forty-five years ago, asks the factfinder to decide if the content 
at issue: (1) appeals to a prurient interest in sex, when taken as a whole and as judged 
by contemporary community standards from the perspective of the average person; 
(2) is patently offensive, as defined by state law; and (3) “lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political or scientific value.” Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). 
25 The U.S. Supreme Court first upheld the FCC’s regulatory authority over indecent 
speech in the face of a First Amendment challenge in 1978. FCC v. Pacifica Found. 
438 U.S. 726, 728 (1978) (holding that “§ 326 does not limit the Commission’s 
authority to impose sanctions on licensees who engage in obscene, indecent, or 
profane broadcasting”). The Court there confronted the issue of “whether the 
Federal Communications Commission has any power to regulate a radio broadcast 
that is indecent but not obscene.” Id. at 729. The Court concluded that the First 
Amendment does not bar the FCC from regulating indecent speech in particular 
contexts and circumstances, such as the time of day and composition of the 
audience, when it would constitute a nuisance. Id. at 750–51. In reaching its 
decision, the Court emphasized that “broadcast media have established a uniquely 
pervasive presence in the lives of all Americans.” Id. at 748. It also focused on the 
fact that “broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to 
read.” Id. at 749. On this latter factor, the Court noted that indecent language on the 
broadcast airwaves can “enlarge[] a child’s vocabulary in an instant.” Id.  
In 2012, the Supreme Court passed on an opportunity to reconsider its holding in 
Pacifica Foundation, finding it “unnecessary . . . to address the constitutionality of the 
current indecency policy.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 258 
(2012). The Court advised the FCC, however, that it was “free to modify its 
current indecency policy in light of its determination of the public interest and 
applicable legal requirements.” Id. at 259. In brief, the Court in Fox Television Stations 
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FCC’s power over, or its current definition of, profane language. 
Scholarly articles concentrating on the FCC’s definition of 
profanity, in turn, are scant and now dated.26 
This Article examines the FCC’s problematic efforts to 
conceptualize profane language since it abruptly announced in 
2004 it would no longer “limit its definition of profane speech to 
only those words and phrases that contain an element of 
blasphemy or divine imprecation . . . .” 27  Blasphemy “is 
generally defined as the act of insulting or showing contempt or 
a lack of reverence for God or something considered sacred.”28 
To paraphrase a song title by the band R.E.M., the FCC’s 
definition of profane language lost its religion fifteen years ago.29 
That switch was somewhat odd, at least at first blush, 
because the historical nexus between profanity and blasphemy is 
longstanding. 30  For example, the Supreme Court of South 
Carolina noted more than a century ago that “profane language 
is language irreverent toward God or holy things.”31 In 1931, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that 
irreverently using the phrase “By God”32 and calling “down the 
curse of God upon certain individuals” 33  during a radio 
broadcast constituted “profane language within the meaning of 
                                                 
in 2012 “sidestepped the longstanding question of whether the First Amendment, 
given today’s multifaceted media landscape, no longer permits the Federal 
Communications Commission to regulate broadcast indecency on the nation’s 
airwaves.” Robert D. Richards & David J. Weinert, Punting in the First Amendment’s 
Red Zone: The Supreme Court’s “Indecision” on the FCC’s Indecency Regulations Leaves 
Broadcasters Still Searching for Answers, 76 ALB. L. REV. 631, 631 (2012). 
26 See, e.g., Keith Brown & Adam Candeub, The Law and Economics of Wardrobe 
Malfunction, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1463, 1496–98 (2005) (addressing the FCC’s 
decision to expand its definition of profane language and calling the Commission’s 
action an “aggressive interpretation” of its statutory authority); Edward L. Carter et 
al., Broadcast Profanity and the “Right to Be Let Alone”: Can the FCC Regulate Non-
Indecent Fleeting Expletives Under a Privacy Model?, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 
1, 46 (2008) (providing a dated but excellent review of the FCC’s regulation of 
profane language through 2008, and arguing that “the FCC could, without offending 
the Constitution, directly regulate profanity as one of the objects of Congressional 
intent in 18 U.S.C. § 1464”). 
27 In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards” Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4981 (2004) [hereinafter 
Golden Globe Awards II]. 
28 Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
29 R.E.M., LOSING MY RELIGION (Warner Brothers 1991). 
30 The Supreme Court of Florida observed in 1944 that practically all of the state 
courts of last resort that had considered the meaning of profanity “define it as the use 
of words importing ‘an imprecation of Divine vengeance,’ of ‘implying Divine 
condemnation,’ or words denoting ‘irreverence of God and holy things,’—
blasphemous.” Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944). See also Carter et al., 
supra note 26, at 3–4 (noting that the Latin roots of “profane” carry a “blasphemy-
related meaning”).  
31 City of Georgetown v. Scurry, 73 S.E. 353, 354 (S.C. 1912). 
32 Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931). 
33 Id.  
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that term as used in the act of Congress prohibiting the use of 
profane language in radio broadcasting.”34 
But, as author S.E. Hinton might put it, that was then, 
this is now.35 Today, the FCC defines profane language on its 
website as “‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a 
public nuisance.”36 Might Howard Stern’s utterance of “fuck” on 
the Good Morning America segment mentioned earlier meet this 
definition?37 And what about an over-the-air radio or television 
station that uses the word “shithole” as allegedly uttered by 
President Donald J. Trump in early 2018 to describe Haiti and 
African countries whose citizens immigrate to the United 
States?38 
This definition of profane language, untethered from its 
religious roots, lingers today in a bizarre state of legal limbo. In 
2007, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit declared 
the FCC’s 2004 secularized approach to profane language 
invalid under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).39 The 
court’s holding was due to the Commission’s failure to offer any 
“independent reasons that would justify its newly-expanded 
definition of ‘profane’ speech, aside from merely stating that its 
prior precedent does not prevent it from setting forth a new 
definition.” 40  But in 2009, the Supreme Court reversed that 
decision in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.41  
On remand to the Second Circuit, the FCC abandoned its 
contention that the broadcasts at issue were profane, thus 
depriving the Second Circuit in 2010 of another opportunity to 
                                                 
34 Id. When Duncan was decided, the relevant legislation was Section 29 of the Radio 
Act of 1927, which provided, in pertinent part, that “[n]o person within the 
jurisdiction of the United States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication.” Id. at 129. The enforcing authority, in 
turn, was the Federal Radio Commission, the forerunner agency to the FCC. See 
Gen. Elec. Co. v. FRC, 31 F.2d 630, 631–32 (1929) (“The act established the Federal 
Radio Commission, with power . . . to make such regulations not inconsistent with 
law.”). 
35 S.E. HINTON, THAT WAS THEN, THIS IS NOW (1971). 
36 Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, FED. COMM. COMMISSION, 
https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/obscene-indecent-and-profane-broadcasts 
(last updated Sept. 17, 2017). 
37 See Eggerton, supra note 6 (addressing the Good Morning America segment described 
here). 
38 See John Hendel, Trump ‘Shithole’ Coverage Prompted More Than 160 Indecency 
Complaints, POLITICO (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/04/03/trump-shithole-media-coverage-
indecency-complaints-454928.  
39 Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. §§551–559, 701–706 (2012)); see Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 
F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
40 Fox Television Stations, 489 F.3d at 461. 
41 556 U.S. 502, 530 (2009). 
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address the profanity issue.42 This suggested, at least to one First 
Amendment scholar, that the FCC “appeared to have retired 
profanity as an independent category for indecency violations.”43 
“Appeared” is the operative word in that last sentence. 
This is because: (1) the FCC continues in 2019 to identify and 
define profane language on its website as a brand of speech over 
which it possesses authority; 44 (2) the FCC’s statutory power 
over profane language remains on the federal code books;45 and 
(3) the FCC, in fact, still considers if content is profane when 
asked to do so.  
For example, in December 2014, the FCC “reject[ed] the 
argument that the word ‘Redskins’ falls within the Commission’s 
definition of profanity.”46 In doing so, the Commission simply 
reasoned that its definition of profanity does not stretch to racial 
or religious epithets. 47  Remarkably, the FCC offered no 
clarification of what its definition of profane language is.48 In 
brief, the Commission merely defined profanity in the negative 
by stating what profane language is not.49 In March 2015, the 
Commission made a point of noting that “[e]nforcing the statute 
and Rule restricting indecent, obscene, or profane broadcasts is an 
important part of the Commission’s overall responsibility for 
regulating broadcast radio and television operations.”50 
Despite such relatively recent indications that the FCC’s 
consideration of profane language is alive and well, it has not 
issued a single Notice of Apparent Liability for profanity (in 
contrast to indecency) since the Second Circuit decision in 2007 
                                                 
42 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 613 F.3d 317, 327, n.7 (2d Cir. 2010), 
vacated, 567 U.S. 239 (2012). 
43 Lili Levi, “Smut and Nothing But”: The FCC, Indecency, and Regulatory 
Transformations in the Shadows, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 509, 547 n.160 (2013). 
44 See Obscene, Indecent and Profane Broadcasts, supra note 36 (providing a link to the 
FCC’s current articulation of profane language). 
45 See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012). 
46 Red Zebra Broad., 29 FCC Rcd. 15495, 15497 (2014).  
47 Id.  
48 See id. (noting only that the Second Circuit in 2007 had invalidated its secularized 
and offensiveness-based nuisance definition that the FCC was confining to words 
involve a sexual or excretory meaning). 
49 The FCC explained in Red Zebra: 
While the Commission has “recognize[d] that 
additional words, such as language conveying 
racial or religious epithets, are considered 
offensive by most Americans,” it made clear its 
intent “to avoid extending the bounds of 
profanity to reach such language given 
constitutional considerations.” Accordingly, 
we reject the argument that the word 
“Redskins” falls within the Commission’s 
definition of profanity.  
Id. (internal citation omitted).  
50 In the Matter of WDBJ Television, Inc., 30 FCC Rcd. 3024, 3027 (2015) 
(emphasis added).  
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declared the Commission’s definition invalid under the APA.51 
In fact, with the exception of one high-profile incident in which 
it found in 2015 that a newscast briefly showing an erect penis 
was indecent, 52  the FCC has been largely dormant 53  in 
penalizing obscene, indecent and profane content since the 
Supreme Court invited it “to modify its current indecency policy 
in light of its determination of the public interest and applicable 
legal requirements.” 54  In a variation of the parlor game of 
guessing whether a former celebrity is dead or alive,55 one might 
reasonably wonder today if the FCC’s policing of profane 
language is dead, dying, or dormant.  
Sadly, all of this confusion and consternation easily could 
have been avoided and the answer could be a definitive “dead.” 
That is because, as described later,56 the FCC asked Congress in 
1976 to eliminate its statutory power over profane language due 
to some of the same issues that now crop up in 2019. Congress, 
however, failed to heed the FCC’s recommendation, as 
evidenced by the presence today of the “profane language” 
clause in 18 U.S.C. § 1464.57  
To further explore and unpack this muddle, Part I reviews 
several key judicial opinions involving profane language.58 Part 
II then examines the FCC’s March 2004 decision to change its 
definition of profane language, contextualizing that shift within 
the framework of a moral panic highlighted by the Super Bowl 
halftime show featuring Janet Jackson just one month earlier.59 
Next, Part III analyzes several problems with the FCC’s current 
definition of profane language, including its susceptibility to 
challenges under the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as 
well as its direct contravention of the general First Amendment 
                                                 
51 Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d, 556 
U.S. 502 (2009). 
52 See generally WDBJ, 30 FCC Rcd. 3024; Clay Calvert et al., Indecency Four Years 
After Fox Television Stations: From Big Papi to a Porn Star, an Egregious Mess at the FCC 
Continues, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 329 (2017) (criticizing the FCC’s Notice of Apparent 
Liability for Forfeiture issued against WDBJ Television, Inc.). 
53 The word “largely” is purposefully chosen because the FCC has issued a few 
orders regarding indecency in the past half-dozen years. See Border Media Bus. Tr., 
29 FCC Rcd. 9488, 9489 (2014) (involving a $37,500 settlement over indecency 
allegations stemming from a radio broadcast); KRXA, LLC., 29 FCC Rcd. 3482, 
3487 (2014) (involving a $15,000 settlement over allegations involving violations of 
both sponsorship identification and indecency regulations); Liberman Broad. Inc., 28 
FCC Rcd. 15397, 15404 (2013).  
54 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012). 
55 See, e.g., Erin Chack, Quiz: Is This Celebrity Dead or Alive?, BUZZFEED (Aug. 22, 
2013), https://www.buzzfeed.com/erinchack/quiz-is-this-celebrity-dead-or-alive.  
56 Infra notes 318–328 and accompanying text. 
57 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2012) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane 
language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”). 
58 Infra Part I. 
59 Infra Part II. 
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rule against censoring speech merely because it offends. 60 
Finally, Part IV concludes that Congress should repeal the FCC’s 
statutory authority over profane language unless the FCC acts 
immediately to redraft its definition in a more concise and 
constitutional manner.61 
 
 REGULATING THE PROFANE IN THE FACE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: A PRIMER 
 
In 1792, all fourteen states that had ratified the U.S. 
Constitution “made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, 
statutory crimes.”62 That, of course, was more than 225 years 
ago—long before the U.S. Supreme Court launched its modern 
First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence “in the early 
twentieth century”63 with the case of Schenck v. United States64 in 
1919.65 
So, if it seems as if profanity is among the few categories 
of speech not protected66 by the First Amendment, then the likely 
culprit is a “famous passage” 67  in the Supreme Court’s 1942 
decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.68 There, the Court made 
the “highly problematic assertion”69 that: 
 
[t]here are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention and punishment of 
which has never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problem. 
                                                 
60 Infra Part III. 
61 Infra Part IV. 
62 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957). 
63 David S. Han, Middle-Value Speech, 91 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 77 (2017). 
64 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
65 See Alexander Tsesis, The Empirical Shortcomings of First Amendment Jurisprudence: A 
Historical Perspective on the Power of Hate Speech, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 732 
(2000) (“Modern First Amendment jurisprudence began with Schenck v. United 
States.”). 
66 See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (identifying categories of 
unprotected expression as incitement to violence, obscenity, defamation, speech 
integral to criminal conduct, fighting words, child pornography, fraud, true threats 
and “speech presenting some grave and imminent threat the government has the 
power to prevent”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) 
(“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of 
speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced 
with real children.”). 
67 Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 
1534 (1993). 
68 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
69 Burton Caine, The Trouble With “Fighting Words”: Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire Is a 
Threat to First Amendment Values and Should be Overruled, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 441, 457 
(2004). This passage is highly problematic because it “invented the theory that entire 
categories of speech are denied First Amendment protection.” Id. at 456. 
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These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or “fighting” 
words—those which by their very 
utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the 
peace. It has been well observed 
that such utterances are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and 
are of such slight social value as a 
step to truth that any benefit that 
may be derived from them is clearly 
outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.70 
 
The above-quoted language is perhaps best known for 
creating the “fighting words” exception to the First 
Amendment.71 It also was favorably cited by the Court in Roth v. 
United States72 to buttress the notion that obscenity falls outside 
the ambit of First Amendment protection. 73  And, most 
significantly for this Article, profane expression also is placed by 
Chaplinsky among the “classes of speech as [falling] outside of the 
First Amendment’s coverage.”74   
Yet, the passage is largely dicta. 75  Dicta, as Professor 
Michael Dorf notes, “typically refers to statements in a judicial 
opinion that are not necessary to support the decision reached by 
the court.”76 In other words, dicta are “comprised of statements 
                                                 
70 Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (emphasis added). 
71 William C. Nevin, “Fighting Slurs”: Contemporary Fighting Words and the Question of 
Criminally Punishable Racial Epithets, 14 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 127, 129 (2015) 
(noting that Chaplinsky “established the ‘fighting words’ exception to the First 
Amendment in American jurisprudence”); Robert M. O’Neil, Hate Speech, Fighting 
Words, and Beyond—Why American Law Is Unique, 76 ALB. L. REV. 467, 472 (2012) 
(observing that Chaplinsky “has been persistently cited with sufficient deference to 
imply that uttering ‘fighting words’ remains a recognized exception to First 
Amendment freedoms”). 
72 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
73 Specifically, the Roth Court cited Chaplinksy, among other decisions, to support its 
assertion that “numerous opinions indicate that this Court has always assumed that 
obscenity is not protected by the freedoms of speech and press.” Id. at 481. 
74 Rodney A. Smolla, Categories, Tiers of Review, and the Roiling Sea of Free Speech 
Doctrine and Principle: A Methodological Critique of United States v. Alvarez, 76 ALB. L. 
REV. 499, 500 (2012). 
75 See P. Brooks Fuller, The Angry Pamphleteer: True Threats, Political Speech, and 
Applying Watts v. United States in the Age of Twitter, 21 COMM. L. & POL’Y 87, 87 
n.1 (“The Supreme Court of the United States outlined several categories of 
unprotected speech under the First Amendment in dicta in Chaplinsky . . . .”) (citing 
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72)). 
76 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994). 
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that do not constitute the court’s holdings.” 77  Chaplinksy’s 
observation that profane language falls beyond the purview of 
the First Amendment, therefore, is nonbinding.  
The notion Chaplinsky carved out a new category 
unprotected of speech for profane language—at least to the 
extent that the term, as noted above, involved denigrating God 
or religion 78 —was put to rest one decade later in Burstyn v. 
Wilson.79 There the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
New York statute banning certain “motion picture films on the 
ground they are ‘sacrilegious.’” 80  In declaring the law 
unconstitutional, Justice Tom Clark wrote for the Court: 
 
from the standpoint of freedom of 
speech and the press, it is enough to 
point out that the state has no 
legitimate interest in protecting any 
or all religions from views 
distasteful to them which is 
sufficient to justify prior restraints 
upon the expression of those views. 
It is not the business of government 
in our nation to suppress real or 
imagined attacks upon a particular 
religious doctrine, whether they 
appear in publications, speeches, or 
motion pictures.81 
 
To the extent that profanity was stripped of its religious 
connotations and now simply encompasses vulgar words that 
might offend, the Supreme Court’s 1971 decision in Cohen v. 
California affords First Amendment protection to such vulgar 
language. 82 There the Court held government entities, “acting as 
guardians of public morality,”83 could not permissibly punish a 
man for peacefully wearing a jacket emblazoned with words 
“Fuck the Draft” in a Los Angeles courthouse.84 In its opinion, 
the Court noted that California “has no right to cleanse public 
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the 
most squeamish among us.”85 Intimating the vagueness issues 
                                                 
77 Lisa M. Durham Taylor, Parsing Supreme Court Dicta to Adjudicate Non-Workplace 
Harms, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 75, 92 (2008). 
78 See, e.g., Kalman v. Cortes, 723 F. Supp. 2d 766, 770 (E.D. Pa. 2010). 
79 343 U.S. 495 (1952). 
80 Id. at 497. 
81 Id. at 505. 
82 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
83 Id. at 22. 
84 Id. at 15. 
85 Id. at 25. 
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plaguing the contested statute, which attempted to regulate 
“offensive conduct,”86 Justice John Marshall Harlan II reasoned 
for the majority that: 
 
while the particular four-letter word 
being litigated here is perhaps more 
distasteful than most others of its 
genre, it is nevertheless often true 
that one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric. Indeed, we think it 
is largely because governmental 
officials cannot make principled 
distinctions in this area that the 
Constitution leaves matters of taste 
and style so largely to the 
individual.87 
 
In a nutshell, the Court in Cohen gave First Amendment 
protection to “the mother of all words commonly labeled lewd 
or profane” in the years since Chaplinsky.88 As Rodney Smolla 
explains, “the fate of the ‘F Word,’ now constitutionally 
protected in many circumstances notwithstanding Chaplinsky, is 
one of many examples of Chaplinsky as an overstatement of 
current outcomes in free speech cases.”89 
The bottom line today is that “profanity’s categorical 
exclusion from the First Amendment is no more.” 90  In fact, 
“[n]ot one of the Court’s opinions over the last half a century has 
mentioned profane utterances as uncovered by the First 
Amendment. Rather, profanity today is often protected from 
government sanctions.”91 
Yet secularized profanity—profanity as a term for vulgar 
curse words, regardless of any religious overtones or 
implications—is not absolutely protected by the First 
Amendment. It can still be regulated in specific circumstances, 
such as when it is uttered by students in public high schools,92 
                                                 
86 Id. at 16 n.1. 
87 Id. at 25. 
88 Smolla, supra note 74, at 501. 
89 Id. at 502. 
90 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395, 412 (2014). 
91 Id.  
92 See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678, 682 (1986) (upholding a 
public high school student’s punishment for giving a speech that centered on “an 
elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor,” and distinguishing the Court’s 
protection of profanity in Cohen v. California, by noting that “[i]t does not follow . . . 
that simply because the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited 
to adults making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude must 
be permitted to children in a public school”). 
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when it rises to the level of fighting words93 or when it targets 
airline personnel in an intimidating fashion.94  
In the last category, consider a federal statute that 
stipulates a punishment for “intimidating a flight crew member 
or flight attendant of the aircraft.”95 In United States v. Lynch,96 
an apparently intoxicated first-class passenger shouted “f[uck] 
this airline”97 and repeatedly yelled “f[uck] you, c[unt]”98 after a 
flight attendant stopped serving him alcoholic drinks. 99  In 
upholding the passenger’s conviction under 49 U.S.C. § 46504, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reasoned the 
statute “sets out a content-neutral prohibition on conduct in a 
specific time, place, and manner.”100 The Court added: “nothing 
in the statute prohibits profanity or any other content, per se.”101 
Anti-profanity statutes still exist. 102  Despite some 
scholars’ contention that these laws are facially 
unconstitutional, 103  they may be permissible if narrowly 
construed to apply only to situations where profanities are 
uttered as fighting words.104 Fighting words are those involving 
“a direct personal insult or an invitation to exchange 
fisticuffs.” 105  As the Supreme Court wrote in Cohen v. 
                                                 
93 See Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 518 (1972) (affirming the unconstitutionality 
of a statute targeting “opprobrious words or abusive language” because its scope was 
not narrowed or limited in construction to fighting words scenarios). Anti-profanity 
statutes, in turn, are sometimes deemed constitutional if they are narrowly construed 
to apply only to fighting words scenarios. Johnson v. Quattlebaum, 664 F. App’x. 
290, 291 (4th Cir. 2016). For instance, a South Carolina statute makes it a 
misdemeanor to use “profane language on any highway or at any public place or 
gathering or in hearing distance of any schoolhouse or church.” S.C. CODE ANN. § 
16-17-530 (2018). In 2014, Krystal Johnson was prosecuted under the statute for 
uttering the decidedly nonreligious-based phrase “[t]his is some motherfucking shit.” 
Johnson, 664 F. App’x. at 291. The Fourth Circuit upheld the statute because a South 
Carolina intermediate appellate court had construed it “to require fighting words for 
a conviction.” Id. at 294. 
94 See United States v. Lynch, 881 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 2018). 
95 49 U.S.C. § 46504 (2012). 
96 881 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 2018). 
97 Id. at 814. 
98 Id.  
99 Id.  
100 Id. at 818. 
101 Id.  
102 See David L. Hudson Jr., Fighting Words: Can Anti-Profanity Laws and the Fighting 
Words Doctrine Be Squared with the First Amendment?, 104 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (2018). 
103 See id. (quoting Professor Jennifer Kinsley for the proposition that “laws banning 
profanity are unconstitutional on their face” and for her observation that “[t]he sole 
justification for these laws is morality-based, which the Supreme Court has held 
insufficient to justify laws regulating fundamental rights”). 
104 See id. (noting that “[t]he reason why such laws are sometimes considered 
constitutional is the fighting words doctrine”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-530 (2018) 
(providing an example an anti-profanity statute in South Carolina that was deemed 
constitutional because, as judicially construed, it was limited in scope to fighting 
words situations). 
105 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989). 
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California,106 fighting words take the form of “a direct personal 
insult” 107  and “personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common 
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.” 108 
Mental offense or discomfort sustained by hearing profanity, as 
one federal district court recently observed, does not give rise to 
a fighting words situation.109 
However, in the absence of either a statute such as the one 
in Lynch110 or a fighting words scenario, secular profanity uttered 
by adults is generally protected by the First Amendment. For 
instance, the Supreme Court of Connecticut recently tossed out 
the breach-of-the-peace conviction of Nina Baccala for calling a 
female supermarket manager “a ‘fat ugly bitch’ and a ‘cunt.’”111 
The Nutmeg State’s high court conceded that Baccala, a 
customer, had “invoked one or more of the most vulgar terms 
known in our lexicon”112 to refer to the store manager’s gender. 
Yet, the Court reasoned that, per the fighting words doctrine, 
“[u]ttering a cruel or offensive word is not a crime unless it would 
tend to provoke a reasonable person in the addressee’s position 
to immediately retaliate with violence under the 
circumstances.”113 Baccala was protected, the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut reasoned, because “the natural reaction of an 
average person in [the store manager’s] position who is 
confronted with a customer’s profane outburst, unaccompanied 
by any threats, would not be to strike her.”114  
With this background on profanity rulings in mind, the 
Article next turns to the FCC’s decision in 2004 to change its 
definition of profane language and its subsequent effort in 2006 
to refine that new definition. Part II contextualizes the 
Commission’s decision within the framework of a moral panic 
then facing the FCC. 
 
                                                 
106 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
107 Id. at 20. 
108 Id.  
109 In Pomicter v. Luzerne County Convention Center Authority, the court held 
unconstitutional a ban on profanity and vulgarity during protests held in areas 
outside of the Mohegan Sun Arena, observing that “the vulgarity ban is not aimed at 
curbing ‘fighting words’ so much as words that may make the listener 
uncomfortable” and concluding that “potential discomfort alone does not elevate 
offensive speech to ‘fighting words.’” 332 F. Supp. 3d 558, 577 (M.D. Pa. 2018), 
amended by, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86338 (M.D. Pa. May 22, 2018). The court also 
added that “[w]ithout more concrete evidence, the Arena cannot justify its broad ban 
based on speculation of violence that may be incited by profanity.” Id. at 579. 
110 See United States v. Lynch, 881 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 2018). 
111 State v. Baccala, 163 A.3d 1, 4 (Conn. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Connecticut v. 
Baccala, 138 S. Ct. 510 (2017). 
112 Id. at 13. 
113 Id.  
114 Id. at 16. 
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 REFLECTING ON A MORAL PANIC FIFTEEN YEARS 
LATER: THE MOVE TO ALTER PROFANE LANGUAGE AT THE 
FCC 
 
Moral panics are “over-heated periods of intense 
concern.” 115  They arise when many people harbor “intense 
feelings of concern about a given threat which a sober assessment 
of the evidence suggests is either nonexistent or considerably less 
than would be expected from the concrete harm posed by the 
threat.”116 The concept was coined by British sociologist Stanley 
Cohen more than forty-five years ago.117 Central to a moral panic 
is an “overreaction”118 or “a highly exaggerated response to the 
original negative event.”119  
Violence in movies, comic books, and video games has 
sparked moral panics, resulting in censorship efforts. 120  For 
example, the music of rapper Marshall Mathers, better known as 
Eminem, spawned a moral panic more than fifteen years ago.121 
New forms of media that are alien to older adults trigger moral 
panics.122 Perhaps more than any variety of media content, it is 
sexual expression that launches moral panics in the United 
                                                 
115 Erich Goode & Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Moral Panics: Culture, Politics, and Social 
Construction, 20 ANN. REV. SOC. 149, 149 (1994). 
116 Id.  
117 Cohen explained that a moral panic occurs when: 
[a] condition, episode, person or group of 
persons emerges to become defined as a threat 
to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylized and stereotypical 
fashion by the mass media; the moral 
barricades are manned by editors, bishops, 
politicians and other right-thinking people; 
socially accredited experts pronounce their 
diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are 
evolved or (more often) resorted to; the 
condition then disappears, submerges or 
deteriorates and becomes more visible.  
STANLEY COHEN, FOLK DEVILS AND MORAL PANICS: THE CREATION OF MODS 
AND ROCKERS 1 (Routledge Classics 2011) (1972). 
118 Carol A. Stabile, Conspiracy or Consensus? Reconsidering the Moral Panic, 25 J. 
COMM. INQUIRY 258, 259 (2001). 
119 Perry Howell, Early Radio News and the Origins of the Risk Society, 10 RADIO J. 131, 
138 (2012). 
120 See William E. Lee, Books, Video Games, and Foul-Mouthed Hollywood Glitteratae: 
The Supreme Court and the Technology-Neutral Interpretation of the First Amendment, 14 
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 295, 352 (2013). 
121 See Gilbert B. Rodman, Race . . . and Other Four Letter Words: Eminem and Cultural 
Politics of Authenticity, 4 POPULAR COMM. 95, 99 (2006) (noting “the midst of the 
moral panic that surround[ed] Eminem”). 
122 See Christopher J. Ferguson & John Colwell, Understanding Why Scholars Hold 
Different Views on the Influences of Video Games on Public Health, 67 J. COMM. 305, 310 
(2017) (“Moral panics often focus on newer forms of media that may not yet have 
been embraced by large swaths of society, particularly older adults. As a key element, 
a negative social narrative forms about this new media, initially based on moral 
repugnance, rather than data.”).  
162 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17 
States. The country, as Professor Bruce Burgett observes, “has 
been characterized from the outset as . . . shaped through a 
history of recurring sex panics.”123 That remains true today. For 
example, concern over teen sexting124 a few years ago constituted 
a moral panic. 125  And consistent with all moral panics that 
“eventually fade,” 126  Professor Kimberlianne Podlas notes “it 
appears the moral panic about teen sexting has faded. Reporting 
on teen sexting had declined significantly.”127  
What are the key ingredients of moral panics? First, the 
media generally play a major role in fanning the flames of fright, 
be it intentionally or otherwise.128 As a 2016 article in Journalism 
Practice notes, “[j]ournalists and the media outlets they work for 
can contribute to moral panic by exaggerating events, publishing 
unsubstantiated claims, or giving preference to certain groups or 
individuals and ignoring others.”129 Second, the role of interest 
groups is important, with one article noting that a moral panic 
involves “the unanticipated and unintended outcome of moral 
crusades undertaken by particular interest groups (e.g., 
professional associations, the police, parent organizations) in an 
effort to draw public attention to, and curtail, a specific set of 
actions.” 130  Other key players in moral panics include “the 
politicians, the experts, and the legislators.” 131  Third, “moral 
                                                 
123 Bruce Burgett, Sex, Panic, Nation, 21 AM. LITERARY HIST. 67, 67 (2009).  
124 See Lawrence G. Walters, How to Fix the Sexting Problem: An Analysis of the Legal 
and Policy Considerations for Sexting Legislation, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 98, 99 (2010) 
(“Sexting, a combination of the words ‘sex’ and ‘texting,’ is the term coined to 
describe the activity of sending nude, semi-nude, or sexually explicit depictions in 
electronic messages, most commonly through cellular phones.”).  
125 Clay Calvert, Legislating the First Amendment: A Trio of Recommendations for 
Lawmakers Targeting Free Expression, 35 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 279, 284–85 
(2017). 
126 Kimberlianne Podlas, Media Activity and Impact, in SEXTING AND YOUTH: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH, THEORY, AND LAW 123, 143 
(Todd C. Hiestand & W. Jesse Weins eds., 2014). 
127 Id.  
128 See Shahira Fahmy & Thomas J. Johnson, Mediating the Anthrax Attacks: Media 
Accuracy and Agenda Setting During a Time of Moral Panic, 15 ATLANTIC J. COMM. 19, 
23 (2007) (“Several studies have indicated the media play a major role in producing 
moral panics, which are when media or politicians sensationalize a social problem 
and present them as a threat to the social order, causing the public to have an 
exaggerated fear of the nature of the problem.”); Angela McRobbie & Sarah L. 
Thornton, Rethinking ‘Moral Panic’ for Multi-Mediated Social Worlds, 46 BRITISH J. 
SOC. 559, 560 (1995) (“Moral panics, once the unintended outcome of journalistic 
practice, seem to have become a goal.”). 
129 Tom Morton & Eurydice Aroney, Journalism, Moral Panic and the Public Interest, 10 
JOURNALISM PRAC. 18, 27 (2016).  
130 Sean P. Hier, Thinking Beyond Moral Panic: Risk, Responsibility, and the Politics of 
Moralization, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 173, 176 (2008). 
131 Julia Laite, Justifiable Sensationalism: Newspapers, Public Opinion and Official Policy 
About Commercial Sex in Mid-Twentieth-Century Britain, 20 MEDIA HIST. 126, 127 
(2014). 
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panics often emanate from a key event.”132 All of these factors 
may coalesce to produce a response from the legal system.133 
This Article argues that a slowly simmering moral panic 
over racy broadcast content suddenly boiled over with a single 
event—the CBS-televised, MTV-produced halftime show of 
Super Bowl XXXVIII on February 1, 2004, featuring the 
uncovering of singer Janet Jackson’s right breast by Justin 
Timberlake.134 The very next month, the FCC radically changed 
and expanded its definition of profane language in pro-censorial 
fashion.135  
The game was watched by approximately ninety million 
people and, perhaps more importantly from a moral panic 
perspective, “as many as one in five American kids between the 
ages of 2 and 11 years caught that halftime show.”136 In vivid 
color, they witnessed Timberlake, reaching across Jackson’s 
“chest, pulling off the right cup of her bodice – which clearly was 
designed to break away easily, like a nursing bra, only black and 
with metal studs and rivets – and revealing her breast, which was 
adorned with a silver ‘nipple guard.’”137 In brief, the halftime 
show’s “wardrobe malfunction,” 138  as Timberlake termed it, 
likely spawned the FCC’s definitional malfunction on profane 
language. 
Professor Jeremy Harris Lipschultz notes that the Janet 
Jackson incident “sparked numerous calls for media decency in 
the United States.”139 However, problems were already festering 
                                                 
132 Bryan E. Denham, Folk Devils, News Icons and the Construction of Moral Panics: 
Heroin Chic and the Amplification of Drug Threats in Contemporary Society, 9 
JOURNALISM STUD. 945, 946–47 (2008). 
133 See Stabile, supra note 118, at 259 (“Rumor, mass media hype, and the 
institutional response to these cause people to panic about crime, which in turn 
causes them to support more stringent law and order measures.”). 
134 See generally Gary Mihoces, Half Provides Kind of Exposure NFL Doesn’t Want, USA 
TODAY, Feb. 2, 2004, at 1C (reporting that “singer Janet Jackson’s breast was 
exposed on national TV during the Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show,” and 
quoting an MTV statement for the proposition that “[t]he tearing of Janet Jackson’s 
costume was unrehearsed, unplanned, completely unintentional and was inconsistent 
with assurances we had about the content of the performance”); Daman Hack, 
Patriots Win 2nd Super Bowl in 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at A1 (reporting 
that “Janet Jackson’s right breast was exposed at the end of her duet with Justin 
Timberlake when he pulled off part of her top”).  
135 The FCC’s March 2004 change of its enforcement policy regarding indecency and 
its conceptualization of profane language are discussed later in this section. See 
generally Golden Globe Awards II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004). 
136 Lisa de Moraes, CBS Gave 90 Million an Eyeful, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2004, at C1. 
137 Id.  
138 This was the term used by Justin Timberlake in a statement to describe what 
happened. See Kelefa Sanneh, Pop Review, During Halftime Show, a Display Tailored for 
Video Review, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at D4 (“Timberlake released a statement, 
too: ‘I am sorry if anyone was offended by the wardrobe malfunction during the 
halftime performance of the Super Bowl. It was not intentional and is regrettable.’”). 
139 JEREMY HARRIS LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST AND INTERNET INDECENCY: 
DEFINING FREE SPEECH 1 (2008). 
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with broadcast content before the “wardrobe malfunction.” As 
Ann Oldenburg summed it up in USA Today, “[t]hough 
television has been pushing the sexual-innuendo envelope for 
decades, this flash of breast, on national television during a 
beloved annual sporting event seen by millions of families, 
suddenly became a culminating moment in a long-simmering 
culture clash.”140 Thus, while Jackson’s breast-baring was “[t]he 
flashpoint for conservative critics”141 over televised indecency, 
trouble had been brewing with salty language and racy images 
on the broadcast airwaves in the two years immediately before 
it.  
For example, during her acceptance speech at the 
Billboard Music Awards in 2002, singer and movie star Cher 
proclaimed she “had my critics for the last forty years saying that 
I was on my way out every year. Right. So f*** ’em.”142 Her 
words were broadcast on Fox network stations.143 In 2003, when 
the Billboard Music Awards were again broadcast on Fox, 
reality-television personality Nicole Richie queried before 
presenting an award, “[h]ave you ever tried to get cow shit out 
of a Prada purse? It’s not so fucking simple.”144 Additionally that 
year, ABC television stations aired an episode of NYPD Blue that 
“showed the nude buttocks of an adult female character for 
approximately seven seconds and for a moment the side of her 
breast.”145 Furthermore, during an acceptance speech at the 2003 
Golden Globe Awards show on NBC, singer Bono of the Irish 
band U2 uttered the phrase “really, really, fucking brilliant.”146 
And finally, just one week before the Janet Jackson fiasco, 
actress Diane Keaton said “shit” during a speech at the 2004 
Golden Globes Award show.147 
It was these incidents that both primed the pump for the 
moral panic148 and later provided the FCC with the vehicle for 
                                                 
140 Ann Oldenburg, A Cultural Clash . . . In a Nation a Flutter, USA TODAY, Feb. 3, 
2004, at 1A. 
141 Geraldine Fabrikant, Need ESPN but Not MTV? Some Push for That Option, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 31, 2004, at C6. 
142 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 247 (2012). 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 247–48. 
146 In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the 
“Golden Globe Awards”, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859, 19859 (2003) [hereinafter Golden 
Globe Awards I]. 
147 Diane Keaton Had a Memorable Golden Globes Moment, ENT. WKLY. (Jan. 27, 
2004), http://ew.com/article/2004/01/27/diane-keaton-had-memorable-
golden-globes-moment/ (reporting that Ms. Keaton “dropped the s-word”).  
148 See Chuck Barney, Super Bowl Furor Fuels Culture War, CONTRA COSTA TIMES 
(Cal.), Feb. 7, 2004, at A1 (reporting that prior to the Janet Jackson incident, “[a] 
furor over . . . foul-mouthed episodes had been building since October [2003], when 
the FCC ruled that Bono’s profanity was not a punishable offense”). 
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changing its definition of profane language in March 2004.149 
Bono’s speech gave the public, as well as crusading interest 
groups such as the Parents Television Council,150 a propitious 
opportunity to apply enhanced pressure on the FCC to better 
police the broadcast airwaves in the months leading up to the 
halftime show at Super Bowl XXXVIII.  
That is because in October 2003, David Solomon, chief 
of the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau, concluded that Bono’s 
statement “really, really, fucking brilliant” was not indecent.151 
The FCC’s definition of indecency requires that speech “depicts 
or describes sexual or excretory activities or organs in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community 
standards for the broadcast medium.”152 Solomon reasoned that 
Bono’s deployment of “fucking” was not indecent because it 
“did not describe sexual or excretory organs or activities. Rather, 
the performer used the word ‘fucking’ as an adjective or expletive 
to emphasize an exclamation.”153 Solomon, however, did not 
consider whether the language was profane; he found only it was 
neither indecent nor obscene.154 
The decision, as Frank Ahrens wrote in the Washington 
Post, “was criticized and derided.”155 Multiple members of the 
U.S. Senate proposed a resolution condemning it.156 The ruling 
also “elicited strong opposition from the Parents Television 
Council.”157 Professor Ira Robbins, in fact, contends it was the 
PTC that “convinced the Commission to review the decision.”158 
Indeed, as one article noted in December 2003, 
Solomon’s conclusion did not sit “well with some, from the 
Parents Television Council (which organized most of the Bono 
complaints) to congressmen to FCC Chairman Michael Powell 
himself, who played no part in the ruling and deemed it 
‘reprehensible’ that children might hear the F-word in any form 
on the air.” 159  Powell, in fact, reportedly circulated a draft 
proposal in January 2004 designed to overturn Solomon’s 
                                                 
149 See Golden Globe Awards II, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975 (2004). 
150 See The PTC Mission, supra note 4; Calvert & Richards, supra note 5. 
151 See Golden Globe Awards I, 18 FCC Rcd. 19859 (2003). 
152 Id. at 19860–61. 
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154 Id. at 19861–62. 
155 Frank Ahrens, Over the Line? Only If Over the Air; FCC’s Reach Doesn’t Extend Beyond 
Broadcast, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2004, at E1. 
156 Frank Ahrens, Nasty Language on Live TV Renews Old Debate, WASH. POST, Dec. 
13, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Ahrens, Nasty Language] 
157 Paul Davidson, FCC: OK, Maybe You Shouldn’t Say That . . ., USA TODAY, Jan. 14, 
2004, at 4D.  
158 Ira P. Robbins, Digitus Impudicus: The Middle Finger and the Law, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1403, 1443 (2008). 
159 John T. McWhorter, Oh, R-o-ob, the Bad Words Won’t Go Away, WASH. POST, Dec. 
28, 2003, at B1. 
166 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17 
decision.160 During a talk that same month at the National Press 
Club in Washington, D.C., Powell called it “irresponsible for our 
programmers to continue to try to push the envelope on a 
reasonable set of policies that try to legitimately balance the 
interests of the First Amendment with a need to protect our 
kids.” 161  Even Comedy Central’s animated show South Park 
spoofed Solomon’s decision in an episode in which students are 
puzzled as “a teacher is shown saying that students can use a 
common swear word ‘only in the figurative noun form or the 
adjective form.’”162 
While the October 2003 Bono ruling garnered the 
attention of FCC commissioners, Congress and the PTC, it was 
the February 1, 2004 airing of the Super Bowl halftime show that 
got “seemingly all of America”163 contemplating what it means 
to go too far in airing explicit content. Indeed, “callers flooded 
CBS affiliate offices with complaints”164 the same night the game 
aired. 
As Frank Rich of the New York Times waggishly summed 
it up, “Janet Jackson’s breast (not even the matched set!) would 
lead to one of the most hysterical outbreaks of Puritanism in 
recent, even not-so-recent, American history.”165 In a nutshell, if 
the October 2003 ruling by Solomon on Bono’s exclamation lit 
the kindling, then “Janet Jackson’s Super Bowl exposure poured 
more fuel on the fire.” 166  The latter incident, simply put, 
“brought indecency to the center of the national political 
discussion.”167 
In accord with the notion that moral panics feature 
interest groups on crusades,168 the one sparked by Janet Jackson 
involved the Parents Television Council. As media defense 
attorney Robert Corn-Revere writes, “policy entrepreneurs like 
Brent Bozell, who then led the Parents Television Council – and 
the FCC – immediately pounced on the 9/16-second flash of 
bejeweled breast flesh as a sign of the End of Days and a call to 
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arms.”169 Indeed, just days after the Super Bowl incident, Bozell 
stated: “[w]e do not accept the apology of CBS, nor do we accept 
the statements of regret by MTV. . . It is absolutely reckless for 
CBS to claim it had no prior knowledge that such activity was 
likely to take place.”170 
FCC chairman Michael Powell immediately declared 
being “outraged at what I saw”171 during the Super Bowl, adding 
that “[o]ur nation’s children, parents and citizens deserve 
better.”172 He announced the FCC would investigate the halftime 
show,173 dubbing it “a classless, crass and deplorable stunt.”174 
The halftime-show incident also fits neatly within the 
framework of a moral panic because, as Erich Goode and 
Nachman Ben-Yehuda point out, “many moral panics are about 
sex.”175 Indeed, Janet Jackson and Justin Timberlake certainly 
served up a saucy, sexually-charged performance. 
With panic swirling, the FCC on March 18, 2004—less 
than seven weeks after Super Bowl XXXVIII—reversed the 
Enforcement Bureau’s October 2003 indecency ruling regarding 
Bono’s acceptance speech.176 Specifically on the indecency issue, 
all five commissioners concluded that: (1) Bono’s speech “is 
within the scope of our indecency definition because it does 
depict or describe sexual activities;”177 (2) any variation of “fuck” 
used in any context “inherently has a sexual connotation;”178 (3) 
it is irrelevant in an indecency determination that a network did 
not intend to broadcast the language;179 and (4) “the mere fact 
that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does 
not mandate a finding that material that is otherwise patently 
offensive to the broadcast medium is not indecent.”180 
But more significantly for purposes of this Article, the 
FCC did not end its review there. It also decided to address, 
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independent from its indecency determination, 181  whether 
Bono’s speech was profane under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. As noted 
earlier, Enforcement Bureau Chief David Solomon never 
considered the profane-language issue in his October 2003 
ruling, having only analyzed questions of indecency and 
obscenity. 182  But that did not prevent the Commission from 
considering the issue sua sponte the month following the Super 
Bowl halftime show debacle.  
In particular, the Commission in March 2004 
acknowledged its “limited case law on profane speech has 
focused on what is profane in the context of blasphemy.”183 It 
told broadcasters, however, they were now “on notice that the 
Commission in the future will not limit its definition of profane 
speech to only those words and phrases that contain an element 
of blasphemy or divine imprecation.” 184  The Commission 
asserted it was free to expand its definition because none of its 
prior cases suggested “that the statutory definition of profane is 
limited to blasphemy.”185 It also cited favorably the U.S. Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals’ 1972 decision in Tallman v. United 
States.186 The Seventh Circuit there opined that profane can be 
understood as “denoting language which under contemporary 
community standards is so grossly offensive to members of the 
public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.”187 The 
Commission in March 2004 reasoned that there was nothing in 
its prior case law regarding profane language that held it “could 
not also apply the definition articulated by the Seventh 
Circuit”188 in Tallman thirty-two years earlier. 
So, what precisely would constitute profane language 
going forward? Unfortunately, the FCC “did not provide specific 
guidance for its new definition of profanity.” 189  It merely 
announced profane language would now include not only 
“fuck,” but also “words (or variants thereof) that are as highly 
offensive as” 190  it when “broadcast between 6 a.m. and 10 
p.m.”191 and “depending on the context.”192 
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It was not until March 2006 that the Commission offered 
up its own definition of profane language. 193  In considering 
multiple cases involving alleged broadcast indecency and 
profanity, the Commission announced that “as a general matter, 
we will analyze potentially profane language with respect to 
whether it is ‘so grossly offensive as to constitute a nuisance.’”194 It 
drew part of that italicized language from the decades-old, 
Seventh Circuit decision in Tallman noted earlier.195 
The Commission also concluded that some words are 
presumptively profane. 196  The presumption, it noted, applies 
only to “the most offensive words in the English language, the 
broadcast of which are likely to shock the viewer and disturb the 
peace and quiet of the home.”197  
The Commission added, however, that even 
presumptively profane language may be protected in “rare 
cases.” 198  These include scenarios where the language “is 
demonstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or educational 
work or essential to informing viewers on a matter of public 
importance.”199 It also explained that the written word “fuck” is 
protected when it appears so briefly on screen that it “would not 
have been noticed by the average viewer.”200 In summary, the 
presumption that certain words are profane is rebuttable in 
special circumstances.  
What words are presumptively profane? “Fuck” and 
“shit.” Specifically, the Commission wrote that “fuck” is “a 
vulgar sexual term so grossly offensive to members of the 
public that it amounts to a nuisance and is presumptively 
profane. It is one of the most offensive words in the English 
language, the broadcast of which is likely to shock the viewer and 
disturb the peace and quiet of the home.”201 It concluded that 
“shit” also fits this same definition,202 adding that it “invariably 
invokes a coarse excretory image.”203 
Significantly, the Commission in 2006 also attempted to 
somewhat confine the scope of its new profanity definition by 
adopting “a presumption that our regulation of profane language 
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will be limited to the universe of words that are sexual or 
excretory in nature or are derived from such terms.”204 It thus 
found words such as “bitch,” “hell,” and “damn,” as well as 
variants thereof, are not presumed to be profane.205 While the 
words “ass” and “piss” “do describe sexual or excretory 
activities,” 206  they are not presumptively profane but may fall 
within the definition of profane language depending on the 
context in which they are used.207 
The problem, however, with this sexual-or-excretory 
limitation on profane language is that it duplicates the 
Commission’s definition of indecency, which also requires that 
the words or images in question “describe or depict sexual or 
excretory organs or activities.” 208  Indecency and profanity 
become redundant. Finally, the Commission in 2006 suggested 
that its use of “nuisance” within its new definition of profane 
language was on “sound constitutional footing”209 because the 
U.S. Supreme Court upheld the Commission’s reliance on a 
nuisance rationale in approving its authority over indecent 
content.210 
The Commission’s 2006 ruling was the last time it 
attempted to offer a definition and clarify the meaning of profane 
language after it decided to expand that concept in its 2004 Bono 
ruling. As noted earlier, 211  the Second Circuit in 2007 struck 
down the FCC’s changes to profane language as unsupported 
under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the Supreme Court 
later reversed the Second Circuit’s opinion and on remand the 
FCC did not pursue a profane-language theory. That left the 
FCC’s definition of profane language in a state of legal limbo.212 
If moral panics involve “exaggerated responses to deviant 
acts,” 213  then the FCC’s decision to radically alter its 
conceptualization of profane language in March 2004 was an 
exaggerated response to a deviant act of breast-baring witnessed 
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by kids.214 Reconsideration of the Bono incident simply afforded 
the Commission a ready-made opportunity to quickly prove its 
mettle to the public and to the Parents Television Council that it 
would aggressively police the airwaves after the Super Bowl and, 
in turn, restore the moral and social order. The FCC’s reaction 
to the one-two punch combination of Bono and Janet Jackson 
thus fits snugly within the notion that the response to threats 
sparking moral panics “is likely to be a demand for greater social 
regulation or control and a demand for a return to ‘traditional’ 
values.”215  
The FCC’s March 2004 decision broadening its definition 
of profane language was an overreaction in the immediate 
aftermath of the Janet Jackson incident. The Commission, as 
noted above, adjusted its indecency policy in that same ruling to 
reach unintentional and fleeting instances of sexual content in 
the future.216 It thus already had at its disposal regulatory power 
over indecency sufficient to punish broadcasters for fleeting and 
supposedly unscripted instances of sexual content on the 
airwaves. It simply did not need to alter its definition of profane 
language to do so. Expanding the definition of profane language 
thus amounted to agency overkill. 
Ultimately, the reaction to the Janet Jackson incident falls 
in line with what Robert Corn-Revere calls “a historical context 
of successive panics about the latest scourge affecting our 
children.”217 And, consistent with the pattern that moral panics 
disappear,218 Professor Lipschultz observes that “[t]he furor that 
was the post-Janet Jackson 2004 Super Bowl era had calmed by 
2006.”219  
What remains more than a decade later, however, is a 
muddle regarding profanity. It is a muddle provoked by a “less 
than one-second baring”220 of a breast—more precisely, “nine-
sixteenths of one second”221—and created in the crucible of an 
awards show containing a single, unscripted expletive uttered by 
an Irish singer. In brief, the moral panic may have died, but its 
lugubrious legacy—a troubling FCC conceptualization of 
profane language that is questionable under the First 
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Amendment—lingers on. Key flaws with that conceptualization 
are addressed in the next part. 
 
 A FATALLY FLAWED EFFORT TO RESTRICT SPEECH: 
ANALYZING PROBLEMS WITH THE FCC’S DEFINITION OF 
PROFANE LANGUAGE 
 
This Part has two sections, each concentrating on a 
different weakness or defect with the FCC’s definition of profane 
language. Initially, Section A analyzes problems with the 
definition under both the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth 
doctrines.222 Section B then explores how the Supreme Court’s 
reenergized defense of offensive expression in recent cases 
hammers another metaphorical nail into the legal coffin of 
profane language at the FCC.223 
 
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenges 
The FCC’s definition of profane language articulated 
today on its website is readily susceptible to facial challenges for 
both vagueness and overbreadth. This section initially analyzes 
that definition for vagueness problems. It then examines 
overbreadth issues. Importantly, these issues were never 
addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
its now-overruled 2007 decision in Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. 
FCC. 224  The Second Circuit merely held that, under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, the FCC had failed to provide a 
reasoned analysis sufficient to justify changing its definition of 
profane language.225  
Under the void for vagueness doctrine, as Professor 
Cristina Lockwood notes, “the Court’s concern has been 
whether the law at issue provides notice of what it allows or 
prohibits.”226 Thus, as Frank LoMonte explains, “[a] regulation 
may be declared void for vagueness if it fails to give intelligible 
notice of the behavior that will result in penalties.”227 Vague laws 
are therefore dangerous largely because “the uncertainty 
regarding how a speech regulation will be applied . . . creates a 
basis for self-censorship.”228 Self-censorship is tantamount to a 
chilling effect on speech under which individuals voluntarily 
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silence themselves due to the fear of prosecution or liability based 
upon what they otherwise might say.229 
In addition to fostering self-censorship, vague laws are 
problematic because they give too much leeway to those charged 
with enforcing them and thus can be applied unfairly and 
unevenly. As the Supreme Court wrote in 2018, the vagueness 
“doctrine guards against arbitrary or discriminatory law 
enforcement by insisting that a statute provide standards to 
govern the actions of police officers, prosecutors, juries, and 
judges.”230 
In brief, as the Court put it in 2012 when examining the 
FCC’s regulation of broadcast indecency, due process “requires 
the invalidation of laws that are impermissibly vague.”231 It went 
on to say that “the void for vagueness doctrine addresses at least 
two connected but discrete due process concerns: first, that 
regulated parties should know what is required of them so they 
may act accordingly; second, precision and guidance are 
necessary so that those enforcing the law do not act in an 
arbitrary or discriminatory way.” 232  The Court added that 
“[w]hen speech is involved, rigorous adherence to those 
requirements is necessary to ensure that ambiguity does not chill 
protected speech.”233 
A law thus will be declared unconstitutionally vague if it 
“fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of 
what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”234 The key is 
that a law must provide “the person of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he 
may act accordingly.”235 
 Is the FCC’s current definition of profane language 
unconstitutionally vague under these principles? The 
Commission defines profane language today on its website as 
“‘grossly offensive’ language that is considered a public 
nuisance.” 236  Although that definition is concise in terms of 
brevity, problems abound. First, the FCC offers no guidance on 
what it means by “offensive.” Second, it provides no description 
of what it means by “grossly.” Third, it is hard to fathom how 
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using the word “grossly” to modify “offensive” adds clarity for a 
broadcaster seeking guidance and fair notice on how to avoid a 
possible civil penalty for airing profane content. All “grossly” 
does is ratchet up the level of offensiveness, but to an unspecified 
and nebulous degree. Modifying “offensive” with “grossly” thus 
does nothing to save the FCC’s definition from vagueness 
problems. The FCC’s use of “grossly” hearkens back to, at least 
in the author’s mind, a humorous scene from the movie A Few 
Good Men.237 There, Lieutenant Commander Joanne Galloway 
futilely adds the word “strenuously” to modify the word “object” 
after her initial objection to a judge is overruled. A flippant 
colleague later mockingly tells Galloway: “‘I strenuously object?’ 
Is that how it works? Hm? ‘Objection.’ ‘Overruled.’ ‘Oh, no, no, 
no. No, I STRENUOUSLY object.’ ‘Oh. Well, if you 
strenuously object then I should take some time to 
reconsider.’”238 
Even if one goes back to the Commission’s 2006 attempt 
to define the scope of profane language,239 problems persist. The 
Commission wrote then that it would confine profane language 
“to the universe of words that are sexual or excretory in nature 
or are derived from such terms.”240 If one cobbles this limitation 
onto the current definition on the FCC’s website, then profane 
language appears to mean grossly offensive sexual and 
excretorial words that amount to a public nuisance. The 
Commission also added in 2006 that presumptively profane words 
were “the most offensive words in the English language”241 that 
are “likely to shock the viewer and disturb the peace and quiet of 
the home,”242 seemingly adding flesh to the concept of a public 
nuisance. After combining this into a cohesive definition that 
arguably construes profane language in a narrow manner to save 
it from vagueness and overbreadth problems, one is left with this 
possibility: Profane language encompasses the most grossly offensive 
sexual and excretorial words that cause shock and disturb the peace and 
quiet of the home. 
Beyond making the questionable assumption that the 
atmosphere in American homes is one of peace and quiet, the 
words “shock” and “disturb” are equally as vague as “grossly 
offensive.” What may shock one listener may not shock another 
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and, in fact, may be entertaining. What might disturb one home 
might not another. Furthermore, the more one hears words like 
“shit” and “fuck” uttered in everyday life, it stands to reason the 
shock and disruption power of those words decreases when they 
are repeatedly heard on the broadcast airwaves. In other words, 
the power of words to offend, shock and disturb is fluid and 
constantly evolving, thus denying broadcasters the fair notice 
that due process requires and that the void-for-vagueness 
doctrine demands for knowing what words, in fact, are profane.  
We now live in a world in which the President of the 
United States discusses grabbing women by the pussy 243  and 
refers to some countries as shitholes.244 To some this may offend, 
but to others this may make Trump more authentic and real. 
More than forty-five years later, Cohen’s maxim that “one man’s 
vulgarity is another’s lyric”245 illustrates why regulating speech 
based on its supposed offensiveness, as the FCC now attempts to 
do with profane language, is unconstitutional because it is 
plagued by vagueness issues. In brief, “some viewers take offense 
to cursing on television whereas others barely notice.”246  
In addition to problems with vagueness, the FCC’s 
definition of profane language has overbreadth issues. In 2008, 
in United States v. Williams, 247 the Court crisply explained the 
overbreadth doctrine in scenarios where free speech lies in the 
balance. Writing for the Williams majority, Justice Antonin 
Scalia wrote, “[a]ccording to our First Amendment overbreadth 
doctrine, a statute is facially invalid if it prohibits a substantial 
amount of protected speech.”248 He added, “we have vigorously 
enforced the requirement that a statute’s overbreadth 
be substantial, not only in an absolute sense, but also relative to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”249 
The first step in an overbreadth analysis, Scalia explained, 
“is to construe the challenged statute; it is impossible to 
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing 
what the statute covers.”250 The second step is determining if the 
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statute penalizes “a substantial amount of protected expressive 
activity.”251 
If the FCC’s definition of profane language is construed 
narrowly in the manner suggested above to encompass only the 
most grossly offensive sexual and excretorial words that cause shock and 
disturb the peace and quiet of the home, this still is overbroad because 
it is not hemmed in by the fighting words exception to the First 
Amendment. As addressed earlier, statutes targeting profanity 
are only permissible today if narrowly construed to apply in 
fighting words scenarios. 252  Given that broadcast television 
inherently does not involve the in-person utterance of personally 
abusive epithets targeting a specific individual, the FCC’s 
definition of profane language fails an overbreadth analysis.  
 
B. The Growing Wall of Protection for Offensive Expression 
The FCC’s current definition of profane language centers 
directly on the alleged offensiveness of words.253 As this section 
illustrates, that focus strongly militates against the definition’s 
constitutionality under the First Amendment. That is especially 
true given the Supreme Court’s protection of offensive 
expression in multiple contexts under the leadership of Chief 
Justice John Roberts.  
As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court in Cohen v. 
California254 made it clear that secularized profanity—in Cohen, 
the word was “fuck”—is sometimes protected by the First 
Amendment. 255  Paul Robert Cohen’s conviction, the Court 
wrote, involved a statute that targeted “offensive conduct”256 and 
rested squarely “upon the asserted offensiveness of the words [he] 
used to convey his message to the public.”257  
Suggesting precisely the type of vagueness problems 
addressed in Section A that plague regulating speech based on 
offensiveness, the Court in Cohen wrote “one man’s vulgarity is 
another’s lyric.”258 In rejecting the argument that states such as 
California can punish the use of “fuck” in an effort “to maintain 
what they regard as a suitable level of discourse within the body 
politic,”259 the Court queried: “How is one to distinguish this 
from any other offensive word?”260 In brief, it concluded that 
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regulating speech because of its supposed offensiveness “seems 
inherently boundless” 261  and “governmental officials cannot 
make principled distinctions in this area.”262 
Subsequent to Cohen, the Court protected offensive 
speech in the 1980s in cases involving a man who burned an 
American flag in political protest 263  and a magazine which 
suggested, in an advertisement parody, that a famous reverend 
had sex with his mother in an outhouse and was drunk while 
preaching. 264  In the former case, Texas v. Johnson, 265  Justice 
William Brennan opined for the majority that “[i]f there is a 
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the 
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply 
because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”266 
In the latter decision, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,267 Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist called the speech in question “offensive”268 
to plaintiff Jerry Falwell and “doubtless gross and repugnant in 
the eyes of most.”269 Nonetheless, a unanimous Court protected 
pornographer Larry Flynt’s flagship publication against a tort 
claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on its 
parodic speech. 270  Rehnquist wrote that a jury could not be 
allowed “to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or 
views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular 
expression.”271  
In much more recent cases, the Court has reiterated the 
principle that speech must not be squelched simply because it 
offends—continuing a movement that spells additional trouble 
for the FCC’s definition of profane language that pivots on 
offensiveness.272 
For example, in penning the majority opinion in 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,273 
Justice Anthony Kennedy observed in 2018 that “it is not, as the 
Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to 
prescribe what shall be offensive.”274 Justice Clarence Thomas, 
in a concurrence joined by Justice Neil Gorsuch, added in 
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Masterpiece Cakeshop that “[s]tates cannot punish protected 
speech because some group finds it offensive, hurtful, stigmatic, 
unreasonable, or undignified.”275 Thomas emphasized that a rule 
allowing the government to squelch speech because it is offensive 
or disagreeable “would allow the government to stamp out 
virtually any speech at will.”276  
In 2017—just one year before Masterpiece Cakeshop—the 
Court protected offensive speech in Matal v. Tam.277 The Court 
in Tam struck down part of a federal statute that allowed the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office to deny registration for marks that 
“may disparage . . . persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, 
or national symbols.” 278  In delivering the Court’s judgment, 
Justice Samuel Alito concluded that this provision, known as the 
disparagement clause, “offends a bedrock First 
Amendment principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground 
that it expresses ideas that offend.”279 Alito added that “[s]peech 
that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, 
disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest 
boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the 
freedom to express ‘the thought that we hate.’”280  
Concurring in Tam, Justice Kennedy buttressed this 
point, writing that “the Court’s cases have long prohibited the 
government from justifying a First Amendment burden by 
pointing to the offensiveness of the speech to be suppressed.”281 
Kennedy intimated that the marketplace of ideas282 provides the 
remedy for offensive speech, not government censorship, when 
he opined that: 
 
A law that can be directed against 
speech found offensive to some 
portion of the public can be turned 
against minority and dissenting 
views to the detriment of all. The 
First Amendment does not entrust 
that power to the government’s 
                                                 
275 Id. at 1746 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
276 Id. 
277 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
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280 Id. at 1764 (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) 
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282 See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6 (1992) (“The 
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benevolence. Instead, our reliance 
must be on the substantial 
safeguards of free and open 
discussion in a democratic 
society.283 
  
Tam thus reaffirms “there is no categorical carve-out from 
First Amendment protection for either offensive or hateful 
speech.”284 In a nutshell, and as encapsulated by New York Times 
Supreme Court reporter Adam Liptak, Tam stands for the 
proposition “that the government may not refuse to register 
potentially offensive names.”285 
The Supreme Court also protected offensive speech in 
2011 in Snyder v. Phelps. 286  There, an eight-justice majority 
shielded the defendants from tort liability for expressing 
offensive messages including “‘God Hates Fags,’ ‘You’re Going 
to Hell’ and ‘God Hates You.’”287 Writing for the majority, Chief 
Justice John Roberts remarked that “[s]uch speech cannot be 
restricted simply because it is upsetting or arouses contempt,”288 
particularly when it involves matters of public concern.289 He 
added that “[i]n most circumstances, ‘the Constitution does not 
permit the government to decide which types of otherwise 
protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection 
for the unwilling listener or viewer.’”290 In a grand rhetorical 
flourish closing his opinion that explains why such offensive 
expression must be protected, Roberts wrote: 
 
Speech is powerful. It can stir 
people to action, move them to 
tears of both joy and sorrow, and—
as it did here—inflict great pain. On 
the facts before us, we cannot react 
to that pain by punishing the 
speaker. As a Nation we have 
chosen a different course—to 
protect even hurtful speech on 
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public issues to ensure that we do 
not stifle public debate.291  
  
Snyder, as Professor Joseph Russumanno summarizes it, 
fell in line with “the Supreme Court’s long-established tradition 
of favoring speech protection even in cases involving offensive 
speech.”292 
Beyond safeguarding offensive words, the Roberts’ Court 
has struck down statutes targeting graphic images some people 
might deem offensive. Specifically, in United States v. Stevens,293 
the Court refused to carve out a new exception from First 
Amendment protection for images depicting animal cruelty.294 
In the process, it declared as unconstitutionally overbroad a 
federal statute regulating such images.295 One year later, in Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Association,296 the Court struck down a 
California statute limiting minors’ access to video games 
depicting images of violence.297 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Antonin Scalia noted that there is no exception to First 
Amendment protection for “whatever a legislature finds 
shocking.”298 
The Court has also protected statements at which one 
might take offense (offense in the sense of umbrage at the fact 
that someone would utter such a statement), even though the 
words used do not involve profanity or swearing. In particular, 
in United States v. Alvarez,299 the Court struck down a federal law 
that criminalized lies about having won a Congressional Medal 
of Honor. 300  Justice Kennedy wrote there for a four-justice 
plurality that 
 
[t]he Nation well knows that one of 
the costs of the First Amendment is 
that it protects the speech we detest 
as well as the speech we embrace. 
Though few might find 
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respondent’s statements anything 
but contemptible, his right to make 
those statements is protected by the 
Constitution’s guarantee of 
freedom of speech and 
expression.301 
  
Perhaps the only case under the leadership of Chief 
Justice Roberts in which the Court failed to protect offensive 
speech from government censorship came in the five-to-four 
decision in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans.302 
In Walker, the Court upheld Texas’s decision to deny an 
application for a specialty license plate featuring Confederate 
battle flag imagery “‘because public comments ha[d] shown that 
many members of the general public find the design offensive, 
and because such comments are reasonable.’”303 
Walker, however, is explained away as an outlier by the 
majority’s belief that specialty license plates in Texas constitute 
government speech, rather than private expression. 304  This 
categorization, in turn, rendered nugatory any First 
Amendment-based speech challenges to Texas’s actions because, 
as Justice Stephen Breyer wrote for the majority, “[w]hen 
government speaks, it is not barred by the Free Speech Clause 
from determining the content of what it says.”305 Texas was thus 
“entitled to refuse to issue plates featuring” Confederate battle 
flag imagery. 306 
In summary, the Supreme Court in recent cases including 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Tam, and Phelps has reinvigorated its 
enduring doctrine of protecting offensive expression. As 
Professor Erica Goldberg recently observed, “America has 
uniquely expansive free speech protections, even for the most 
intolerant, offensive speech.”307 That certainly is true today, as 
this subsection indicates. All of this suggests yet another reason 
why the FCC’s definition of profane language revolving around 
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 CONCLUSION 
 
It is important to understand that 18 U.S.C. § 1464, the 
statute that gives the FCC authority over profane language on 
the broadcast airwaves, is criminal in nature308 and carries with 
it a possible prison sentence. 309  Specifically, it provides that 
broadcasters, who carry such content, “shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”310 
Despite the gravity of such sanctions, the FCC’s current 
definition of profane language: (1) is problematically vague and 
overbroad;311 (2) overlaps with the Commission’s definition of 
indecency;312 and (3) has not been invoked by the FCC to punish 
broadcasters since at least 2012 when the Supreme Court invited 
the FCC to consider adjusting its indecency regime.313 Therefore, 
to the extent it penalizes profane language, 18 U.S.C. § 1464 is a 
prime example of “legal obsolescence”314 that should spark both 
its prompt reconsideration and revision by Congress. 
Furthermore, and to the point that it now is clear—Chaplinsky 
dicta to the contrary315—that profanity is generally protected by 
the First Amendment, 316  18 U.S.C. § 1464’s prohibition on 
profane language is an example of what Guido Calabresi aptly 
called “legal petrification.” 317  Congress must act because, as 
Calabresi concluded more than thirty-five years ago, “as a single 
solution to statutory obsolescence, the independent 
administrative agency and the government bureau have been a 
dismal disappointment.”318  
That assessment was not always true when it came to the 
FCC’s regulation of profane language. In fact, the FCC in 
August of 1976 recommended that Congress revoke the 
Commission’s authority over profane language due to concerns 
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that it was likely unconstitutional. 319  Richard E. Wiley, then 
chairman of the FCC,320 explained in a letter to Vice President 
Nelson Rockefeller and the members of the U.S. Senate that 
“[b]ecause of the serious constitutional problems involved, we 
have recommended deletion of the ‘profanity’ provision.”321 
In the “Explanation of Proposed Amendment” 
memorandum that accompanied Wiley’s letter, the FCC 
justified its effort to have Congress remove its power over 
profane language by noting, among other things, “the 
infrequency with which modern courts have construed the word 
‘profane,’ and the sparsity of decisions which have upheld it 
against constitutional attack.” 322  The memo cites the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Burstyn v. Wilson, 323  addressed 
earlier in this Article, 324  as casting doubt on definitions of 
“profane” involving religious overtones325 that “are drawn from 
decisions dating back into the last century.”326 The memo also 
contends that definitions “fraught with religious 
connotations”327 “raise questions under the Free Exercise Clause 
of the First Amendment as well as questions of vagueness and 
overbreadth.”328 Furthermore, the memo notes that Chaplinsky’s 
language regarding fighting words would not apply to profanities 
on the broadcast media because “there is no physical contact 
between speaker and hearer in electronic communication.”329  
Congress, however, failed to take action on Chairman 
Wiley’s recommendation regarding profane language, as 
evidenced by the fact that “profane language” remains in 18 
U.S.C. § 1464 today. Had Congress heeded his advice more than 
forty years ago, the muddle today (and this very article, in fact) 
would not exist. 
When the FCC eventually did update its definition of 
profane language fifteen years ago, it did so only when 
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threatened by a moral panic 330  and, as the Second Circuit 
observed in 2007, set “forth no independent reasons that would 
justify its newly-expanded definition of ‘profane’ speech, aside 
from merely stating that its prior precedent does not prevent it 
from setting forth a new definition.” 331  The FCC will likely 
never, at least on its own volition in today’s political climate, 
publicly profess to ceasing enforcement of anti-profanity rules on 
the airwaves. After all, what administrative agency wants to be 
deemed a supporter of profanity? Surely, this would be the rallying 
cry of family-friendly public interest groups if the Commission 
announces its decision to engage in wholesale regulatory 
forbearance 332 when it comes to enforcing its statutory power 
over profanity. 
The phrase “profane language” thus should be eliminated 
by lawmakers from 18 U.S.C. § 1464 unless the Commission acts 
immediately to better define that term. Abolishing the 
Commission’s authority over profanity would still leave it with 
power over obscenity—a constitutionally troubling clout, as the 
Supreme Court holds that such speech falls outside the sphere of 
First Amendment protection333—and indecency.  
The bottom line is that times change, and the law, in turn, 
sometimes must change with it. The federal statute that grants 
the FCC power over profane language was adopted in 1948,334 
while Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927 gave the Federal Radio 
Commission (the precursor to the FCC) power over profane 
language.335 That is more than seventy years ago if one counts 
from 1948 and more than ninety years if one starts all the way 
back in 1927.  
Either way, administrative agency statutory power over 
broadcast profanity has been on the books for decades without 
being revisited by Congress. It is, in brief, a legislative remnant 
of a bygone era when the profane was more closely related to 
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religion and, in turn, does not comport with today’s linguistic 
culture. As this author contended elsewhere, “[a]ny piece of 
legislation captures only the concerns, agonies and worries of 
lawmakers, their constituents and, perhaps, the news media at a 
single point in time, akin to a static legislative snapshot rather 
than a continually unspooling reel of film.”336 Unless the FCC 
takes immediate action to redefine profane language in a 
constitutional manner, Congress itself should amend 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1464 by removing “profane language” and not replacing it with 
another category of expression. Given that the Supreme Court 
today protects much speech that offends, adopting a new 
category of regulated expression to replace the profanity 
classification would almost inevitably prove to be 
constitutionally futile. 
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